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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
TABLE XII
TIME ELAPSED BETWEEN DIsPosiTioN OF 1953-1954 REPORTED CASES
AND DATE O FILING IN THE SUPREME COURT
Time elapsed divided Into
periods of six months
6 months or less .........................
6-12 months .............................
12-18 months .............................
18-24 months .............................
24-30 months .............................
30-36 months .............................
36-42 months .............................
42-48 m onths .............................
4&-54 months .............................
54-60 months .............................
60-66 months .............................
66-72 months .............................
Totals ...........................
Number of eases
80
83
37
19
8
4
6
6
1
1
1
246
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Paul M. Hebert*
Disbarment
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Theard the court en-
tered an order disbarring the respondent attorney, thus disposing
on the merits of proceedings considered on exceptions during the
1952-1953 term.2 The respondent attorney had forged and sold
a mortgage note in 1935. In 1936 interdiction proceedings were
begun and he was actually under interdiction until 1948 when he
resumed the practice of law. The principal defense urged on
behalf of the respondent attorney was his mental illness at the
time of his admitted misconduct. It was urged by the respon-
dent that he could be guilty of no intentional wrong because of
his mental incapacity. The court rejected these contentions
stating:
"When a lawyer has committed peculations, forgeries
and breaches of trust, he violates the oath he has taken to
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 225 La. 98, 72 So.2d 310 (1954).
2. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Theard, 222 La. 328, 62 So.2d 501 (1952),
discussed in The Work of the Lousiaina Supreme Court for the 1952-1953
Term-The Legal ProfessAon, 14 LOUISIANA LAw REvmw 74, 78-79 (1953).
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Percentage
32.52
33.74
15.04
7.72
3.25
1.62
2.44
2.44
.41
.41
.41
100.00
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demean himself honestly in his practice and the good charac-
ter he possessed no longer exists. And it will not do. for
respondent to say that he was suffering from a mental aber-
ration or amnesia depriving him of the ability to distinguish
between right and wrong. In disbarment, unlike criminal
prosecution or a civil suit for recovery of money based on an
offense or quasi offense, consideration of the interest and
safety of the public is of theutmost importance for, whereas
it may not be humane to punish by confinement to prison
one who labored under the inability tounderstand the nature
of his wrongful acts, it is quite another matter to permit such
a person to continue as an officer of the court and to pursue
the privilege of engaging in: the honorable profession of
counsellor-at-law when he, by his misconduct, has exhibited
a lack of integrity and common honesty. And in our opinion
it matters not whether the dishonest conduct stems from an
incapacity to discern between. right, and wrong or was en-
gendered by a specific criminal intent.' 3
Additional contentions founded upon alleged constitutional rights
of the attorney were dismissed as having no merit. Again, the
court gave expression to the familiar doctrine that the license to
practice law is not a natural right or a constitutionally granted
right, but is a privilege that may be withdrawn after notification
and opportunity to be heard are given.4 Under the admitted and
notorious facts involved in this proceeding no other decree than
that of disbarment would have been possible. The long delay
that was involved in having the attorney's name stricken in this
case (six years from the restoration of capacity or nineteen years
from the date of the commission of the offense) does not reflect
creditably upon the ability of the legal profession to purge itself
expeditiously of unworthy members through the disbarment
process.
Attorneys Fees
Estimating the value of an attorney's work presents delicate
questions of considerable difficulty. General principles on fixing
the amount of the fee as set forth in the Canons of Professional
Ethics are of considerable assistance, but still allow wide range
3. 72 So.2d 310, 312 (La. 1954), quoting with approval from the earlier
case of Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Theard, 222 La. 328, 335, 62 So.2d 501,
503 (1953).
4. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1866); Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall.
505 (U.S. 1873).
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for differences of opinion on the question of whether a particular
fee is reasonable or unreasonable. 5 In Peiser v. Grand Isle, Inc.6
the plaintiffs, owners of two percent of the stock of the defen-
dant corporation, unsuccessfully sought the appointment of a
receiver for the defendant corporation.7 Under the authority of
a special statutory provision s the defendant corporation moved
to assess attorneys' fees in the amount of $20,000 against the
plaintiffs. The facts showed that the entire matter had been
concluded in a period of five months. The three attorneys who
worked on the case testified that they worked for two and one-
half months almost exclusively on the matter, which included an
appeal to the Supreme Court and which involved extensive re-
search into financial records and operations of the corporation.
The lower court fixed the fees of the attorneys at $12,500 and
the Supreme Court by a four to three decision affirmed. The
majority opinion stated that in estimating the value of an attor-
ney's work, the court will take into consideration the responsi-
bility incurred, the importance of the litigation, the amount in-
volved, the extent and character of the labor performed, and the
legal knowledge, attainments and skill of counsel. The conclusion
of the majority found support in the testimony of three dis-
interested leaders of the New Orleans bar who testified as experts
that an award between $10,000 and $20,000 or between $15,000
and $20,000 would be reasonable. In his dissenting opinion, Chief
Justice Fournet expressed strongly his views that $5,000 would
amply compensate the attorneys for the services rendered. In his
view the value of the expert testimony was tempered by the
consideration that members of the same profession are not likely
to underestimate the value of professional services when testify-
ing as experts. 9 To this reviewer, it appears clear that the
5. See Canons of Professional Ethics, Articles of Incorporation of the
Louisiana State Bar Association, Article XVI, Canon 12, 21 WEST'S LA. R.S.
393 (1950).
6. 224 La. 299, 69 So.2d 51 (1953).
7. Peiser v. Grand Isle, Inc., 221 La. 585, 60 So.2d 1 (1952).
8. LA. R.S. 12:753(C) (1950) provides: "If the minority shareholder un-
successfully prosecutes his cause for the appointment of a receiver, he shall
not only be condemned to pay the cost of the proceedings, but shall be fur-
ther condemned to pay reasonable' counsel fees, and other reasonable ex-
penses to the corporation.
9. The Chief Justice quoted from Peltier v. Thibodaux, 175 La. 1026,
1031-1032, 144 So. 903, 904 (1932); "The opinion of eminent lawyers as to the
value of services rendered by members of their profession in any given case
is helpful, and should always be considered. At the same time courts should
and do keep in mind that there is an esprit de corps among men of the
same profession which restrains them from underestimating the value of
their own services."
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expert testimony in this case was eminently fair and met the
high standards that are exacted by a leading authority who has
written on this problem.0
Contempt Proceedings
Gautreau v. Gautreau"l involved a proceeding to review the
validity of a contempt finding against the relator who, as an
attorney, had been found in contempt for failing to obey an order
of the court that he remain for the reading of a pleading relator
had filed on behalf of the defendant in a divorce case, urging a
change of venue. The court recalled the supervisory writs,
finding no merit in the defendant's contentions that the motion
for a change of venue was not properly before the trial court.
There is indication from this decision that the Supreme Court
will not interfere with the district court's findings in matters of
contempt unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. 12
"Visiting Attorney"
In Perkins v. Perkins3 the court was asked to pass upon the
petition of a member of the Mississippi bar for a judgment de-
claring that he could appear before a Louisiana court as a "visit-
ing attorney." It was shown and admitted by the petitioner that
he had been a resident of the City of Baton Rouge for thirty
years and was a qualified voter of that city. The court held under
these facts that he could not be considered a "visiting attorney"
under Louisiana's reciprocity statute. The limited reciprocity
statute involved was so clear in its provisions that it was virtually
an imposition on the courts to request a judicial interpretation
in this case. 4
10. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 197 (1953): "Difficult and delicate problems not
infrequently arise in connection with requests by other lawyers to testify as
to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of fees in dispute, opinions of
other lawyers experienced in matters of the nature involved being obviously
of impressive significance in such cases. While considerations of courtesy
and fraternity should not deter a lawyer from so testifying as an expert, it
will be found that those of the highest standing and experience are usually
the least apt to be dogmatic as to the precise amount which would be
proper. Fortified for cross-examination with a precise prior understanding
of all the circumstances surrounding the case and, if possible, with the
amounts charged by him and by others in similar matters, he can say with
assurance what he himself would charge in the particular case."
11. 225 La. 254, 72 So.2d 497 (1954).
12. Said the court: "This Court, in reviewing contempt proceedings
under its supervisory jurisdiction, will examine only those matters relating
to the jurisdiction or power of the court and the regularity of the pro-
ceedings." 72 So.2d at 499.
13. 224 La. 1034, 71 So.2d 558 (1954).
14. LA. R.S. 37:214 (1950).
